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CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR CREATIVE TAX
SHELTER PROMOTERS: NINTH CIRCUIT RESTRICTS THE
GOVERNMENT'S ARSENAL OF POWER-United States v.
Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2363 (1984).
In UnitedStates v. Dahlstrom,I the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the criminal tax fraud convictions of five tax advisers. 2 The defendants had been convicted for developing and promoting a program in
which a United States taxpayer shifted taxable income to a controlled
trust in a tax-haven country. 3 The Ninth Circuit held that, as a matter of
law, the promoters of the foreign trust arrangement could not be convicted of counseling fraud because the particular scheme had not yet been
declared fraudulent. 4 Through its decision the court has restricted the
government's campaign against abusive tax shelters, and placed a constitutional limit on the powers available to the government for use against
the promoters of creative tax shelters.
Part I of this Note outlines the mechanics of the foreign trust arrangement. The legal background of the case is presented in Part II, followed in
Part III by the reasoning of both the majority and the dissent. Part IV
analyzes the decision, 5 concludes that the court misapplied the fair-notice
protection of the fifth amendment to reverse the convictions, and
discusses the potential effects of the decision on the government's tax
6
compliance enforcement program as recently strengthened by Congress.
I.

THE FOREIGN TRUST ORGANIZATION ARRANGEMENT

Five defendants were convicted by a jury and sentenced to prison for
conspiring to aid or counsel the preparation of fraudulent income tax returns. 7 The defendants, acting as tax advisers, consultants, and preparers,
1. 713 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2363 (1984).
2. Id. at 1424.
3. See infra Part 1.
4. 713 F.2dat 1428.
5. This Note analyzes only the issue of reversing the convictions on the fifth amendment ground
that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding of the requisite intent to defraud. The decision
also involved two other issues, which are beyond the scope of this Note: (1) the first amendment
rights of the promoters to advocate such a scheme; and (2) the question of when preparation or presentation of a tax return occurs. Id.
6. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
7. United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied. 104 S. Ct.
2363 (1984). The defendants were tried on seven counts. Count I charged all defendants with conspiracy to defraud the government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). Counts I1 through VII
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had advocated the use of foreign trust organizations (FTO's) as a means
to reduce United States income tax. The tax shelter program 8 promoted
by the defendants required the establishment of three trusts in a country
that did not tax trust income. The taxpayer served as trustee of Trust One,
which existed only to act as trustee of Trusts Two and Three. The taxpayer engaged a foreign individual to create the foreign trusts, but appointed no independent trustees. The taxpayer funded the trusts with income-producing assets, thereby shifting taxable income to the foreign
country,9 and subsequently received the trust profits back as a tax-free
"gift." Thus, the taxpayer at all times had complete dominion over the
assets and activities of all trusts involved.
charged one or more of the defendants with aiding or counseling the preparation of fraudulent tax
returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (1982).
8. The tax shelter arrangement developed by Dahlstrom. which he and the other defendants had
promoted since 1976, did not involve the typical sale of a partnership interest in a tax shelter. Instead,
the defendants sold memberships in the American Law Association (ALA). None of the defendants
were attorneys or certified public accountants: Dahlstrom therefore began to operate through the
ALA, a membership organization, after being permanently enjoined from practicing law in Missouri
in 1974. Brief of Appellant Dahlstrom at 3, United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied. 104 S.Ct. 2363 (1984). In 1977 both Dahlstrom and the ALA were enjoined
from the practice of law in Washington. Id. at 8.
Taxpayers who bought memberships attended two-day seminars, paying a fee ranging from S6.000
to $12.000. At the seminars the members received instruction in setting up foreign trusts and the
necessary forms for trust formation. 713 F.2d at 1425. They also received a "'taxpayer defense program"--the suggested approach to take when the Internal Revenue Service (Service) audited their
tax returns. Id.
The taxpayer defense program consisted of instruction on lawful actions to take if the Service
attempted to audit the taxpayers, including insisting on tape recording all meetings and refusing to
provide any information unless the Service answered 30 questions that the ALA had set forth in a
form letter. Brief of the Appellee at 20. United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1983).
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2363 (1984).
9. 713 F.2d at 1425-26. In one version of the scheme, the taxpayer transferred assets to Trust
Three. A frequently used asset was the packet of materials received from the ALA. Trust Two then
purchased the packet from Trust Three for $50,000, reselling it to the taxpayer at no gain. The taxpayer claimed a tax deduction of $50,000 under I.R.C. § 212 (1982). on the theory that the payment
was deductible as tax advice.
At that point the $50,000 profit was in Trust Three, which had no United States source income
since the payment came from Trust Two, a foreign trust. Trust Three was not subject to tax in either
country. Trust Two had United States source income but it also had an offsetting deduction, so a
United States non-resident tax return filed for Trust Two would reflect no taxable income. Other
versions of the scheme involved the transfer of inventory or other property of the taxpayer. the sale
and leaseback of business assets, or the provision of managerial services by Trust Three.
The final step in the plan involved returning the profits to the taxpayer. Trust Two borrowed the
$50,000 from Trust Three, issuing a demand note. Trust Three made a -'gift" of the note to the
taxpayer-I.R.C. § 102 (1982) excludes gifts from gross income, and id. § 2501 provides a gift tax
exemption for gifts of intangible property by a non-resident alien to a United States citizen. The
taxpayer then collected on the note from Trust Two, thus reacquiring the $50,000 free of tax. An
alternative method involved a demand loan from Trust Three to the taxpayer. In actuality, the cash
never left the possession or control of the taxpayer and the transactions were mere paper entries.
For a discussion of the ALA program, as well as its predecessor family trust schemes, see Taxation
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

CriminalTax Fraud

1. Tax Avoidance vs. Tax Evasion
Tax fraud is a uniquely difficult crime to recognize. It begins at some
point on a continuum that runs from legitimate tax avoidance, by prudent
arrangement of one's financial affairs, to outright tax evasion such as
falsification of a tax return. Tax avoidance is the acceptable and open use
of the tax provisions to reduce tax liability. 10 Tax evasion, on the other
hand, generally involves misrepresentation, subterfuge, camouflage,
concealment, or an attempt to obscure events. "1It is difficult, however, to
identify the point at which a tax avoidance scheme becomes sufficiently
devious or deceitful to be considered criminal. The inability of both the
courts' 2 and Congress 13 to clearly distinguish the two concepts further
confuses the area.
The distinction ultimately turns on the taxpayer's state of mind. The
criminal tax fraud statutes require willfulness, a specific intent to evade
tax. 14 The requisite intent must frequently be determined inferentially, by
an analysis of such circumstantial evidence as the degree of concealment,
artifice, or device. 15 While certain activities overtly demonstrate the intent to evade, 16 that intent is not always easily recognized.
17
Courts have avoided defining or delimiting "fraud" in their decisions
because to do so would promote compliance with the letter rather than the
spirit of the law and reward subtle and ingenious circumventions. For this
same reason, Congress does not specifically define fraud in the tax
Section of the Washington State Bar Association, The 'FamilyTrust" Tax Scam. A Special Report.
Wash. St. Bar News, March, 1981, 31, 35-38.
10. See generally H. BALTER. TAX FRAUD AND EVASION § 2.03 (4th ed. 1976).
11. R. PAUL, STUDIESIN FEDERAL TAXATION 16-17 (1937).
12. See, e.g., Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 388 (1957) (Court used both terms
when discussing carryover of net operating losses); United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338
U.S. 451, 454-55 (1950) (Court used both "avoided" and "evasion" when discussing taxation of a
corporate sale).
13. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 269,552 (1982) (terms used together).
14. See infra text accompanying note 36.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Mecham, 422 F.2d 838, 838 (10th Cir. 1970) (the issue of criminal intent or guilty knowledge is usually a question of fact for the jury to determine, for it is seldom
susceptible of proof by direct evidence).
16. The Supreme Court has stated that willful attempt to evade could be inferred from "keeping
a double set of books, making false entries or alterations, or false invoices or documents, destruction
of books or records, concealment of assets or covering up sources of income ... any conduct, the
likely effect of which would be to mislead or conceal." Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499
(1943).
17. Id.
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statutes. 1S Courts have applied this reasoning in mail fraud' 9 and securities fraud 20 cases as well as tax fraud decisions. Mail fraud decisions hold
that the presence or absence of fraud must be determined from the particular facts. 21 The securities decisions state that when a defendant is on
trial for a new type of fraud the verdict should not turn on the absence of a
previously litigated fact pattern precisely on point; that absence may be a
tribute to the ingenuity and cupidity of those involved but should not pro22
vide an escape from the penal sanctions of the law.
2.

Characteristicsof Tax Evasion Schemes

Fraud is frequently perpetrated by cloaking a transaction in the form of
an acceptable tax avoidance arrangement. To expose the transaction, the
government may invoke the sham transaction doctrine, 23 analyzing the
economic substance of the arrangement rather than its form. 24 The entire
series of events is then telescoped into its bare elements-what was actually accomplished, and how does the tax law treat such means and ends?
Under the sham transaction doctrine, the court will completely disregard
the transaction when assessing tax liability. To escape application of the
doctrine the transaction must be at least partially motivated by a business
objective other than tax avoidance. 25 The Supreme Court has not indi26
cated, however, the precise level of business purpose required.
Even though the transaction will be disregarded for civil tax liability
18. Id.
19. See. e.g.. United States v. Toney, 605 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 444 U.S.
1090 (1980): Weiss v. United States. 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.). cert. denied. 314 U.S. 687
(1941). For a discussion of the expansion of judicial interpretations of the mail fraud statute, see
generally Hurson. Limiting the FederalMail FraudStatute-A Legislative Approach. 20 A,%iCRIM
L. Rhv 423 (1983).
20. See. e.g.. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1977). There are no set rules for
defining fraud under the securities laws. For examples of acts that have been held to constitute fraud.
see I FED SEC L. REP (CCH) C 4845.035 (§ 17(a)) (1982): 2 FED Stic L. REP (CCH) f 22.781.025
(§ 10(b)) (1980).
21. See Foshay v. United States. 68 F.2d 205. 211 (8th Cir. 1933). cert. denied. 291 U.S. 674
(1934).
22. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336. 339-40 (2d Cir. 1977).
23. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473. 477 (1940) ("The government may look at actualities
and upon determination that the form employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax
event is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves the purposes
of the tax statute.-').
24. See infra note 74.
25. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (holding a sale and leaseback
arrangement a sham): Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (indebtedness underlying interest deduction held to be a sham).
26. Gans, Re-examining the Shan Doctrine: W'hen Should an Overpaynent be Reflected in
Basis? 30 BUFFALO L. REv 95. 105 n.37 (1981).
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purposes, a sham cannot always be attacked as criminal. Tax law is complicated, complex items can be treated in various ways, and innocent errors are frequently made. If an error is innocently made, or results from a
difference of opinion between the taxpayer and the Service, criminal lia27
bility will not lie.
B. Notice Requirementof Specific Intent Crimes
A sham transaction can result in criminal liability only if the perpetrator had prior notice that the transaction was illegal. 28 This "principle of
legality" in criminal law is derived from the notice requirement of the
fifth amendment's guarantee of due process of law, which mandates that a
person be given fair notice as to what constitutes illegal activity so that
behavior can be conformed to the requirements of the law. 29 The principle prohibits both ex post facto legislation and ex post facto judicial construction of a statute) 0 Thus, not only the statute but the relevant judicial
31
gloss must be established at the time of the infraction.
In keeping with the principle of legality, criminal statutes are to be
strictly construed according to their specific terms. Fraud statutes, however, are intentionally written in general terms, so that they cannot be
easily circumvented. Generality is acceptable because specific culpable
27. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 496 (1943) (the purpose of the law is not to penalize
frank differences of opinion or innocent errors made in spite of the exercise of reasonable care).
28. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 27-64 (2d ed. 1960).
29. Id. Courts have consistently held that a statute, as modified by judicial gloss, must be written
so that a person of common intelligence can properly interpret the statute and understand how it will
be applied. See, e.g., Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979) (conviction for false statement reversed because statute did not "plainly and unmistakably" proscribe the conduct); Lambert v.
Calfomia, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (felon registration ordinance could not be applied unless it
included actual knowledge of the duty to register); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617-18
(1954) (lobbying statute upheld because it sufficiently specified the included offenses so that the court
could apply it); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (statute prohibiting "being a
gangster" invalidated because it did not provide sufficiently specific notice).
In Precious Metals Assocs., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 620 F.2d 900 (1st Cir.
1980), the First Circuit evaluated the standard of notice to be applied when the perpetrators are members of a select group of persons with specialized knowledge. Id. at 907 (drawing on the Supreme
Court's decision in Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). The language of the
statute should be judged in light of the particular commercial practice of those charged, in order to
determine whether the statute would clearly identify the conduct proscribed.
30. The specific constitutional prohibitions apply strictly to criminal statutes, not to judicial interpretations. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798).
31. The Supreme Court has invoked the due process clause to expand the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto legislation to include ex post facto judicial construction of a statute. Bouie
v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964); Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941)
("judicial enlargement of a criminal act by interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the
common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness").
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intent is an essential element of the crime. 32 One who acts without a bad
motive will automatically fall outside the sanctions of the statute. Thus,
the statutory provisions cannot become a trap for those who act in good
33
faith.
The Supreme Court has considered the lack of specificity in the tax
fraud statute and held that it contains no unworkable standards. 34 The
crime consists of three elements: (1) the defendant must have aided,
assisted, procured, counseled, advised, or caused the preparation or presentation of a tax return; (2) the return must have been false or fraudulent
as to a material matter; and (3) the defendant's acts must have been willful. 35 The element found lacking in Dahlstrom was willfulness-the
"voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." 36 Applying the
general requirement of willfulness to a tax promotion, the promoter commits fraud if the transaction advocated has no business purpose (that is,
has no substance or is a sham), the promoter knew that the arrangement
was a sham, and the promoter intended to assist taxpayers in the evasion
of legally required taxes by use of the sham.
The jury then is faced with three questions of fact: (1) whether the tax
program in a particular case was devoid of economic substance; (2)
whether the defendants knew of the program's invalidity: and (3) whether
the defendants actually intended to assist the taxpayers to defraud the
government. 37 The appellate court need only decide whether the record
evidence could reasonably support the finding of guilt beyond a
32. See Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARV L. REv 77. 85
(1948).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942): Gorin v. United States. 312
U.S. 19, 27-28 (1941): United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264,267 (1927).
34. United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942). The Court in Ragen, dealing with the predecessor to § 7206, noted that the statute does not delegate policymaking powers to the court or jury by
merely requiring them to apply the statute to a particular action, nor does it call upon the jury to
exercise superhuman powers or to speculate on the actions performed. The statute does not leave
open a wide inquiry, whose scope no one can foresee or guard against. It does not punish or penalize
acts merely because the court orjury determines them to be unjust or unreasonable.
35. United States v. Dahlstrom. 713 F.2d 1423. 1426-27 (1983). cert. denied. 104 S. Ct. 2363
(1984); United States v. Perez, 565 F.2d 1227, 1233-34 (2d Cir. 1977): United States v. Crum. 529
F.2d 1380, 1382 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976).
36. 713 F.2d at 1427 (relying on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Pomponio.
429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976)). The Court in Pomnponio, and also in United States v. Bishop. 412 U.S. 346
(1973), refined and clarified the definition of "willful" as used in § 7206: no evil motive is required.
merely the motive for an intentional violation of the law. Ponponio,429 U.S. at'12. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Brooksby, 668 F.2d 1002, 1004 (1982), held that the term "willful" requires proof of a specific intent to do something that is forbidden by law; "more than a showing of
careless disregard is required." See also United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979): United
States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160 (4th Cir. 1974): infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
37. A conviction for a criminal offense requires that every element of the offense be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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reasonable doubt, 38 considering the evidence in the light most favorable
39
to the prosecution.
C. PriorCaseLaw Applying Tax FraudStatutes
In applying the tax fraud statutes to determine willfulness, courts must
focus on the intent of the taxpayer or adviser. When the court finds a
fraudulent transaction and convicts the defendant, but the defendant at the
time of the action had reason to believe in its validity, convictions have
been reversed for lack of notice. The seminal Supreme Court case in the
area is James v. United States,40 in which the Court reversed the fraud
conviction of a taxpayer who did not report embezzled funds as taxable
income. James based his defense on a prior Court ruling that embezzled
41
funds were not taxable.
The Fourth Circuit followed the James decision in United States v.
Critzer,42 reversing the conviction of a taxpayer who did not report rental
income. The defendant was relying on advice from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs that rental income from Indian lands was not subject to income
tax. 43 The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Garber,44 also drew upon
James in reversing the conviction of a taxpayer who failed to report the
proceeds from the sale of blood plasma. In Garber,however, the specific
question of taxability of blood plasma proceeds had not been previously
decided, so the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for
further consideration of expert testimony on the state of the law and for
45
determination of the defendant's intent.
38. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).
39. Glasserv. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
40. 366U.S. 213 (1961).
41. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946). The decision in James overturned Wilcox,
declaring embezzled funds taxable, 366 U.S. at 221, but reversed James' conviction on fair notice
grounds, id. at 221-22.
42. 498F.2d ll60(4thCir. 1974).
43. Critzer twice received written statements from the Bureau of Indian Affairs that the Department of the Interior believed that the income from her holdings was exempt from income tax. Id. at
1161.
44. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
45. Garber's conviction was originally affirmed, but upon a rehearing en banc a split Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded, holding (1) that "when the law is vague or highly debatable the defendant-actually or imputedly-lacks the requisite intent to violate it," that willfulness
requires knowledge of a legal duty, and that a "criminal proceeding is an inappropriate vehicle for
pioneering tax law," id. at 97-100.
Rather than reverse on legal grounds, however, the Garber court remanded the case to the trial
court to determine whether willfulness could be inferred from the defendant's actions. Id. The Garber dissent pointed out the inconsistency of the majority opinion. If willfulness depends on the taxpayer's state of mind and motivation, then the testimony of an expert witness on the taxability of the
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In contrast to the James line of cases, a line of circuit court decisions
has upheld convictions for tax fraud, even in instances where the application of the law was unclear, when the lack of clarity arose from the lack of
any decision on the question rather than from a contrary ruling on the
question. The Ninth Circuit upheld a jury conviction for willful intent to
evade tax in United States v. Clardy.46 Clardy, a tax adviser, prepared
returns claiming a deduction for prepaid interest; the returns were found
fraudulent because the purported underlying debt had no economic substance. 47 The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Baskes, 48 likewise affirmed the conviction of an attorney who had devised a unique plan to
funnel his client's capital gain to a foreign trust by means of prearranged
commodity transactions. 49 Finally, just a few months prior to the
Dahlstrom decision, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Ingredient
Technology Corp.,50 upheld the conviction of a corporation and its president for using the LIFO inventory method to fraudulently decrease the
corporation's income. 5 1 In none of these cases did the court hold that the
defendant failed to receive proper notice, even though the specific scheme
52
had not previously been declared illegal by the courts.

payments is irrelevant. The trial court had originally found guilty intent without considering expert
testimony. Id. at 112 (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting).
46. 612 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1980).
47. Id. at 1152. The court found no economic validity to the debt underlying the purported interest payment. In response to Clardy's argument that the question of whether or not interest is paid is a
tax issue not free from doubt, the Ninth Circuit upheld the jury instruction, which stated:
If you find from the evidence that transactions do not exist except in form and are otherwise
unreal or sham, you are to consider whether the defendant willfully engaged in such conduct for
the purpose of procuring, counseling, advising, or preparing or presenting false federal income
tax returns ....
Id. at 1152-53. Thus, the Ninth Circuit allowed the jury to determine first the sham nature of the
transactions, and then the intent of the defendant.
48. 687 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1981).
49. Id. at 167. The foreign commodity transactions had no economic validity. When Baskes
argued that he could not have intended to violate § 7206(2) because the law was unclear, the court
replied that -[the evidence amply supports the jury's conclusion that the transactions were shams
and that Baskes was well aware of their illegality." Id. at 169.
50. 698 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3111 (1983).
51. The court held that there was no substantive increase in inventory: the supplier had already
agreed to repurchase the inventory immediately after year-end. The supplier pleaded guilty to two
counts of aiding in the presentation of a fraudulent return under § 7206(2). Id. at 92 n. I. The court
held that intent could be inferred from a secret agreement between Ingredient and the supplier, and by
the fact that the plan was not revealed to Ingredient's auditors or attorneys. Id. at 96.
52. The Second Circuit, in Ingredient, specifically rejected the claims of due process, stating that
"of course it is immaterial that 'there is no litigated fact pattern precisely in point. "'Id. at 96
(quoting from United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336. 339-40 (2d Cir. 1977)).
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III.

THE DAHLSTROM COURT'S REASONING

On appeal, the Dahlstrom court reversed the jury verdict, holding that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of the crimes
charged. 53 The court stated that the dispositive issue in this case was
"whether the evidence shows that appellants acted with the specific intent
to violate section 7206(2)."54 In reversing, the court held that the defendants could not have intended to violate a "known legal duty" since they
had no way of knowing that the tax shelter program they were promoting
was in fact fraudulent. They could not have known of its fraudulence because their particular program was not the subject of any clearly relevant
precedent. 55 The court stated that the recent Tax Court decision of Zmuda
v. Commissioner,56 which held the FTO scheme invalid, should not have
been considered since it was decided after the allegedly criminal activities
57
occurred.
The court rejected what it considered to be the government's major
contentions: that the FTO's had no economic substance and were blatant
shams, and that the "taxpayer defense program" provided to the ALA
members was inconsistent with a belief in the legality of the plan. 58 The
court relied on the testimony of the government's own witness to show
that the trusts were valid legal entities and thus had economic substance. 59 The court explained that the defendants could not have known
that the FIO's were invalid because their validity was "still a highly debatable issue.' '60 The court interpreted the uncertainty regarding the validity of the FTO's as a contradiction to the government's contention that
the defendants clearly knew of the arrangement's illegality.61
The court concluded that, since the legality of the FrO arrangement
was unsettled by any clearly relevant precedent, the defendants, as a

53. United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2363(1984).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1428.
56. 79 T.C. 714 (1982); see infra note 75.
57. 713 F.2d at 1427.
58. Id. The court disposed of a third contention of the government, that certain statements made
by one defendant indicated guilty knowledge of the other defendants, by ruling the evidence inadmissable hearsay. The exception in FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), regarding coconspirators, did not
apply since the government had not independently proved conspiracy. 713 F.2d at 1428.
59. 713 F.2d at 1427.
60. Id. A former regional counsel for the Service testified that a number of tax practitioners had
appoached his office because they were confused about the laws regarding foreign trusts. In response
to the perceived confusion, the Deputy Director of the Service issued a position paper on the use of
foreign trusts.
61. Id.
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matter of law, lacked the required intent to violate the law. 62 The Ninth
Circuit reiterated the Fifth Circuit's statement in Garber, that a "criminal

proceeding pursuant to section 7206 'is an inappropriate vehicle for
pioneering interpretations of tax law.' "63 The purpose of the criminal
tax law is not to "penalize frank difference of opinion," 64 and the court
concluded that there was a frank difference of opinion between the defendants and the government; therefore, the intent required by the criminal
65
statute could not have existed.
The Dahlstrom court also rejected the government's second contention, that advocating a "taxpayer defense program" indicated an intent to
defraud. 66 Relying on the government's concession that the defensive actions advocated were not unlawful, the court concluded that the defendants' advocacy would not translate into awareness of the illegality of the
67
FTO arrangement.

In his dissent, Judge Goodwin pointed out that substantial evidence existed to support the jury's verdict. 68 He reasoned that the government did
not rely on Zmuda but on "settled principles of tax law regarding sham
'gifts' and transactions" to provide notice that the FTO transactions were
illegal. 69 The purported gifts in the FTO scheme were invalid because the
taxpayers at all times controlled the activities of the trusts. 70 After
62. Id. at 1428 (relying on United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974)).
63. Id. at 1428 (quoting United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 100 (5th Cir. 1979)).
64. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973) (quoting Spies v. United States. 317 U.S.
492,496(1943)).
65. 713 F.2d at 1428. However, the court left open the possibility of civil penalties.
66. Id. For a discussion of the taxpayer defense program, see supra note 9.
67. 713 F.2d at 1428.
68. Id. at 1430 (Goodwin. J., dissenting).
69. Id. In support of the sham transaction doctrine Goodwin cited, among other cases. Knetsch
v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (nonrecourse loans secured by annuities had no economic
substance and payments made were not deductible as interest), and Gregory v. Helvering. 293 U.S.
465 (1935) (transfer of assets pursuant to a plan of reorganization disregarded for tax purposes since
the assets had no relation to the business of the corporations).
70. In support of his conclusion on the nature of the gifts, Goodwin relied upon Royce v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 761 (1952) (gift of rental property to parents not valid because parents agreed to
return the property), and Jackson v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 470 (1935) (gift of corporate stock
was revocable-income taxed to donor). 713 F.2d at 1430 (Goodwin, J.,dissenting).
Judge Goodwin noted "obvious" knowledge of tax evasion on the part of the defendants, as evidenced by numerous recommendations to ALA members including the use of false identification
numbers on trust bank accounts; the establishment of multiple trusts to make transactions more difficult to trace, the use of "copy-not" pens when signing checks so that signatures would not appear on
bank microfilm records, and the use of fictitious names on the trust accounts and on non-resident tax
returns filed in the United States. Id.
Goodwin also saw evidence of knowledge of illegality in the requirement that participants sign an
affidavit agreeing not to aid the government in any civil, criminal, or administrative action against the
promoters, and not to provide the government with any information about their relationship with the
promoters. Id.

936

Constitutional Protection for Tax Shelter Promoters
deciding that the notice provided by established tax law was constitutionally adequate, Judge Goodwin stated that it was obvious from the evidence of subterfuge that the defendants knew their program was illegal. 7 1
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS
The Invalidity of the Transactions

The Dahlstromcourt exalted form over substance, entirely ignoring the
sham transaction doctrine and settled principles of trust tax law. The court
based its decision on the valid existence of the foreign trusts. 72 The
court's reliance on their existence was misplaced, however, since trust
existence does not lend validity to trust transactions. It is not the jural
existence of the trusts that controls but their purpose and the way they are
utilized. This is true under both the sham transaction doctrine7 3 and con74
ventional trust tax law.
The transactions carried out by means of the foreign trusts were subject
to attack on several grounds. In civil suits decided after the alleged criminal activity, the Tax Court ruled that the entire arrangement was a
"sham," that it had no economic substance, and that all activities involving the trusts should therefore be disregarded in determining the tax
71. 713 F.2d at 1430 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
72. 713 F.2dat 1427.
73. See, e.g., Furman v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 360, 363-64 (1966), affid, 381 F.2d 22 (5th
Cir. 1967) (trust that was valid under Florida law was not recognized for tax purposes-physician
placed property in a trust that lacked economic substance). When the form of the transaction has not,
in fact, altered any cognizable economic relationship, the courts will look through the form and apply
the tax law according to the substance of the transaction. This rule applies regardless of whether or
not the trust entity is recognized under state law. Id.
74. In order to determine the true grantor and beneficiary in trust tax law, courts look to the
economic realities of the trust, disregarding its legal form and ostensible trustee, beneficiary, and
grantor. Bixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 788-91 (1972). The criteria for determining the validity of a transfer of income producing property to a trust are: (1) the grantor must not retain substantially the same control over the property that was held before the transfer; (2) all transactions between
the grantor and the trust must be in writing and at arm's length; (3) the arrangements between the
grantor and the trust, after the original transfer, must have a bona fide business purpose; and (4) the
grantor must not maintain a disqualifying equity interest in the transferred property. Mathews v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 12 (1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967
(1976). Although the Fifth Cicuit reversed the Tax Court decision in Mathews, the Tax Court has
continued to apply the criteria in other circuits, and the Ninth Circuit adopted the Mathews criteria in
May v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 1984).
Applying the Mathews criteria to the FTO plan, the transferors clearly failed not one but all four of
the requirements: (1) the grantors maintained complete control over the property since there were no
independent trustees; (2) none of the transactions were at arm's length prices, the shift of income was
accomplished by paying exhorbitant prices for goods and services; (3) the only purpose of the taxpayer in dealing with the trust was to defeat income tax; and (4) the grantor at all times maintained an
equity interest in the assets (if any) of the trust.
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liability of the individual or corporation that created and used the trusts. 75
The transactions could also have been attacked under traditional trust tax
law. 76 Under no view could the foreign trusts, even as valid entities, prevent the taxation of the income to the taxpayer who established and benefited from them.
In Dahlstrom, the first consideration, whether a transaction is without a
business purpose, and therefore a sham, should have been a question of
fact for the jury. The question involves an analysis of the economic substance of the transactions, and of whether the taxpayer has any business
purpose other than tax avoidance. The law in this area is not uncertain, 77
75. The Service proceeded against several taxpayers who followed Dahlstrom's program. disallowing the deductions claimed on their individual or corporate tax returns. The Service has successfully upheld the disallowances in civil proceedings. The Tax Court, in Zmuda v. Commissioner. 79
T.C. 714 (1982), aff'd, 731 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1984). Professional Serv. v.Commissioner. 79 T.C.
888 (1982), and Akland v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. 51 (1983), held that FTO transactions were
devoid of economic reality. The fees paid were not allowed as deductions, and negligence and fraud
penalties were assessed against the taxpayers.
Although the civil rulings were made after the activities of the defendants, the law applied by the
Tax Court, regarding sham transactions and trust taxation, was available to the defendants.
76. Even if the trusts were accepted as valid entities and the transactions were considered to have
substance, the trusts would have been treated as either grantor trusts or business trusts. The establishment of a grantor trust, even in a foreign country, will generally result in all income being currently
taxable to the grantor. t.R.C. §§ 674(a). 677, 679 (1982); see also Corliss v. Bowers. 281 U.S. 376.
378 (1930) (income of a revocable trust will be taxed to the grantor even though paid to a beneliciary). Thus, any income shifted to Trust Three would still be taxable to the United States taxpayer.
The trusts established by the ALA members were purportedly business trusts, also known as
"Massachusetts Trusts" or common law trusts. Akland, 46 T.C.M. at 53. They are a form of business organization, an arrangement whereby property is conveyed to trustees to be managed for the
benefit of the holders of beneficial certificates. 12A C.J.S. BUSINEss TRUSTS 2 (1980). The certificates entitle the holders to share ratably in the income, and in any proceeds upon termination. The
trust operates as a corporation, and is in fact treated as a corporation for tax law purposes. I.R.C. §
7701 (1982); see also Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 153 (1924) (Congress clearly intended to
extend the corporate income tax to organizations doing business as associations). When a trust is
taxable as a corporation it is also subject to the controlled foreign corporation rules of I.R.C. §
951-964 (1982). Any income of the trust would be taxed to the beneficiary either when earned. 1d. §
951, or, at the latest, when any distribution is received, id. § 955. The purported "'gifts" would be
taxed either as a withdrawal of previously taxed income or as a dividend.
Alternatively, the income of the trusts would be subject to reallocation by the Service. which has
the authority to allocate income, deductions, and credits between a United States taxpayer and any
related foreign entity, as necessary to clearly reflect income. I.R.C. § 482 (1982). Because the trusts
have no assets and no activities, all income should be allocated to the taxpayer under § 482.
The transactions were also vulnerable to attack under the assignment of income doctrine, which
states that an individual cannot avoid tax on an item of income by merely assigning the right to
receive the income without also transferring the property from which the right arises. Income from
property is taxed to the owner of the property; income from services is taxed to the one who performs
those services. The fruits of labor or property may not be "attributed to a different tree from that on
which they grew." Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. I 11,115 (1930). The income funneled to Trust Three
was earned by the United States taxpayer, either through personal efforts or through the sale or use of
property.
77. See supraPart IIA2.
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only the individual fact patterns vary. The Tax Court has consistently
ruled that the FTO transactions are invalid, 78 and the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the Zmuda decision, holding that the transactions had neither economic substance nor business purpose. 79 The court found "no
real difference" between those two rules;8 0 they "share the same rationale" and elevate substance over form. Merely structuring a transaction to
satisfy formal legal requirements, as the ALA members did by establishing valid foreign trusts, does not require the government to give legal
effect to a transaction whose sole purpose is to evade tax. 8 1 Thus, the case
must turn on facts, as determined by the jury; the Dahlstromjury found
that the transactions, as promoted by the ALA, had no business purpose
82
or economic substance.
The business purpose question focuses on the goals of the ALA clients,
and Dahlstrom contended that his personal guilt or innocence should not
turn on the business purpose or tax evasion purpose of his clients. 83 His
contention is correct-his guilt should turn on his intent to counsel fraud.
But the jury was instructed that they were to judge his intent, as inferentially established by his activities, and their decision of fact should not be
disregarded.
Furthermore, regardless of any business purpose of the FTO's, under
trust tax law the gift of trust assets back to the grantor was a taxable
event. The taxpayer transferred assets to a foreign trust, then the trust
gave the proceeds from the sale or use of those assets back to the taxpayer. 84 Even assuming the foreign trusts were valid entities and the trust
with positive income was not subject to United States tax, 85 the taxpayer
still had complete control over the assets of all three trusts. That control
78. See supra note 75.
79. Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1984). Judge Goodwin, who dissented in
Dahlstrom,was on the panel that affirmed Zmuda.
80. Id.at 1420.
81. Id.at1421.
82. Although the trusts were valid entities, the jury found their use fraudulent, apparently rejecting Dahlstrom's contention that some case law supported the position that the FTO arrangement was
valid. Brief of Appellant Dahlstrom, supra note 8, at 25. The principal case relied on by the defendants in their substance-versus-form argument is Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595 (1968).
Dahlstrom's brief states that "'The ALA program is very similar to the program adopted by the taxpayer in Bass v. Commissioner." Brief of Appellant Dahlstrom, supra note 8. at 25 n.30. The parallels between the Bass arrangement and the FTO program, however, are tenuous.
The Tax Court concluded in Bass that the controlling factor is not the personal purpose (tax.avoidance) of the taxpayer/shareholder who creates the entity. Rather, it is whether the purpose is to be
accomplished by an entity that is carrying out a substantive business function, or engaging in substantive business activity. 50 T.C. at 601.
83. Brief of Appellant Dahlstrom, supra note 8 at 26.
84. See supra Part 1.
85. United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1983). cert. denied. 104 S. Ct. 2363
(1984).
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included the power to transfer assets from the trust to the taxpayer in the
form of a tax-free note. 86 Thus, even if the ALA members had used their
FTO's for some valid business purpose, the eventual transfer of assets
was a taxable event, and the characterization of that transfer as a non87
taxable gift or loan was ineffective.
B.

Lack of Notice-Intent to Evade

The Dahlstrom court misapplied prior case law by following the reasoning of James and its progeny, rather than following Clardy, Baskes,
and Ingredient.88 The James and Critzer criminal tax fraud convictions
were reversed for lack of notice based on legal uncertainty. 89 Contrary to
Dahlstrom, the taxpayers there were relying on affirmative statements
from the government regarding a transaction's taxability. 90 The
Dahlstrom court applied the James rationale inappropriately by analogizing the legal uncertainty in James and Critzer, where the question was
whether the income was taxable, to the factual uncertainty in Dahlstrom,
where the question was whether the circumstances fell within established
tax laws. 9 1 The validity of the FTO transactions could be determined by
applying established tax law to the factual situation. Referring such a
factual question to the jury in no way violated the defendant's fifth
amendment right to notice.
The court should have instead applied the rationale of its own decision
in Clardy-that, although the specific fact pattern involved has not been
86. Id. at 1426.
87. See supra note 76. The dissent recognized that the transactions advocated by the defendants
were "sham transactions to evade taxes." Id. at 1430 (Goodwin. J.. dissenting). Judge Goodwin
declared that the purported gifts of notes back to the trustors should be disregarded "'because the
taxpayers controlled the transactions of their trusts." Id.
88. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. The
Dahlstrom opinion does not mention any of these cases. The court's disregard of all three cases is
difficult to understand. Clardv was a recent Ninth Circuit case relied on by both parties in their briefs.
and Ingredient was issued only months before Dahistrom and would clearly limit Garber. one of the
cases on which the Dahlstrom court primarily relied.
89. James r. United States, 366 U.S. at 221-22: United States v. Critzer. 498 F.2d at 1162.
90. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
91. 713 F.2d at 1427. The court saw the subsequent release of an IRS position paper on the
FFO's as an indication of the unclear status of the law. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Yet
the law regarding foreign trusts was not unclear, only the application of that law to the Dahlstrom
facts. Moreover. the taxation of foreign trusts is a highly technical area in tax law, thus it is neither
surprising nor significant that a number of attorneys and accountants had questions concerning it. The
practitioners' uncertainty as to the treatment of the FTO's does not indicate confusion or conflict
within the government as to the validity of the arrangement, nor does it evidence a government belief
that the Dahlstrom scheme was valid. See United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp.. 698 F.2d
88, 96 n.8 (1983) (issuance of a revenue ruling in 1979 does not signify a lack of clarity in the law in
1975).
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litigated, the jury can properly determine the defendant's guilt. 92 Thus,
even if the legal result of a particular factual situation is unclear, the taxpayer may still be convicted if there is sufficient evidence from which the
jury can find that the defendant had a willful intent to evade. 93 The
Dahlstromjury found that willful intent to evade.
Just as in Clardy, Baskes, and Ingredient, adequate notice was available to the Dahlstrom defendants, through general case law on fraud and
sham transactions. 94 The same information was available to them that
was used by the Tax Court when it ruled that the FTO transactions were
baseless shams. Had the Dahlstrom court ruled properly on the question
of notice and reached the question of intent, it would have found sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of a willful intent to evade.
Intent to evade tax is generally proven by inference; 95 thus, the trial
court evaluated the actions of the defendants to infer their intent. By making willfulness an element of the crime, Congress reduced the specificity
required of the statute, intentionally giving the jury wide latitude in
92. See supra note 47. Clardy can perhaps be distinguished from Dahlstrom because the Supreme Court had previously ruled on the propriety of an interest deduction in Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), affirming a Ninth Circuit decision, Knetsch v. United States, 272 F.2d
200 (1960). However, the relationship between the interest deductions in Knetsch (on the purchase of
annuity savings bonds) and the interest deductions in Clardy (on the purported purchase of land at
greatly inflated prices) requires no more tenuous analogy than would relating Dahlstrom's trusts to
the family trusts struck down in Wesenberg v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 1005 (1978).
93. United States v. Clardy, 612 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Garber,
607 F.2d 92, (5th Cir. 1979); see supra note 45 and accompanying text. The Dahlstrom court quoted
the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Garber that "when the law is vague or highly debatable the defendant-actually or imputedly-lacks the requisite intent to violate it." 713 F.2d at 1428. The Garber
situation is parallel to that in Dahlstrom; the question of taxability of the proceeds had not been
judicially determined, just as the validity of the FTO arrangement had not been determined. Yet the
facts of Garber distinguish it from Dahistrom: the activity was clearly defined and understood; Garber's actions were not attacked as "shams"; the only question was whether the income was taxable.
In Dahlstrom, the activities promoted were intentionally myriad, complex, and difficult to trace, and
the principal question was whether the purported form of the activity would prevail over its substance. Dahlstrom and his co-defendants went to elaborate lengths to hide and obfuscate the transactions because those transactions, when viewed as a whole, demonstrated that nothing substantive
occurred.
94. Dahlstrom and his co-defendants were holding themselves out as tax consultants when they
conducted their "seminars." They purported to have studied the laws regarding foreign trusts extensively, and claimed knowledge regarding tax fraud provisions; they should, presumably, be held to
the specialized knowledge standard of the class in which they placed themselves. See supra note 29.
The "commercial practice" in which they operated suggests that they be held to the specialized
meaning of fraud as used in § 7206(2), i.e., they should be held to have known that the FTO transactions had no economic substance.
The fact that neither Dahlstrom nor the other defendants were licensed accountants or attorneys
should not be controlling. Cf. Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926) (unlicensed
chiropractor judged by the standards applied to a licensed chiropractor); see also W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON. THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 226 (5th ed. Student ed. 1984).
95. See supra note 16.
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determining the motivation of the defendants. 96 The dissent enumerated
several instances where the defendants advised subterfuge, evidencing
their doubts about the validity of the transactions. 97 The jury apparently
thought that such subterfuge does not indicate a "frank difference of
opinion."- 98 By ignoring the instances of subterfuge and ruling that the
evidence was insufficient to show a willful intent to evade taxes, the
Ninth Circuit invaded the province of the jury. 99
C.

The Effect of the Dahlstrom Decision

The Ninth Circuit was "convinced that the legality of the tax shelter
program advocated by the [defendants] in this case was completely unsettled by any clearly relevant precedent on the dates alleged in the indictment." 100 In holding that the law regarding the fraudulence of FTO's was
"completely unsettled," and that therefore the defendants could have no
intent to defraud, the Dahlstrom court has created the rule that a novel tax
evasion scheme cannot provide grounds for criminal charges unless a statute specifically covers the scheme or there has been a ruling in a prior
civil tax case.
If this standard is to be adopted, then the developers and promoters of
any creative tax scheme will be constitutionally protected from prosecution until the scheme can be tested in Tax Court, a period of perhaps
several years. 10 1 Such a standard would reward the ingenuity of the
96. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
97. See supra note 70.
98. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943): see supra note 27.
99. Further manifestations of Dahlstrom's intent that were disregarded by the court included the
"+
"taxpayer defense program provided to the ALA members. See supra note 8. The government
argued that the program was inconsistent with a belief in the legality of the tax shelter program. The
court found nothing in the taxpayer defense program to indicate intent to defraud, since the individual
actions recommended to the taxpayers were all legal in themselves. 713 F.2d at 1428. This evidence.
however, should be considered in connection with all the other evidence, which cumulatively goes to
the subjective intent, rather than looking, as the Ninth Circuit did, at the surface legality of the pieces
of the whole.
Another indication of intent pointed out in the dissenting opinion was the requirement that all
participants sign an affidavit agreeing not to aid the government in any action against the defendants.
Id. at 1430 (Goodwin. J.. dissenting). The fact that the promoters insisted on such a promise is
relevant evidence of intent, even though the promise would likely be unenforceable as contrary to
public policy. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1630A (3d ed. 1972). Judge Goodwin thought it
I'obvious" that the defendants knew that they were advising tax evasion. 713 F.2d at 1430
(Goodwin, J.,dissenting).
100. 713 F.2d at 1428.
101. The opinion implies that a position statement by the Service, such as a regulation. or a
revenue ruling that the particular scheme has no economic substance and is a sham. would provide
the requisite notice. Id. at 1427, 1428. This raises a question whether the Service really has (or
should have) that degree of legislative authority in a criminal area, but the issue is beyond the scope
of this Note.
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perpetrators, something the Second Circuit has warned against. 102 The
taxpayers who purchase or subscribe to the new schemes will receive no
similar protection, since the civil tax laws, including the assessment of
negligence and fraud penalties, are applied retroactively with no notice
requirement.
In setting this standard, the Ninth Circuit seems to be searching for a
non-existent bright line on the tax avoidance-evasion continuum. Such a
bright line would require either complete specificity in the tax fraud statutes or judicial decisions on each new scheme that is developed. The first
is an impossibility. The second is administratively infeasible because of
delay, and as a policy consideration it is detrimental to the voluntary
compliance system. 103 Moreover, a bright line is not necessary to provide
tax advisers with adequate notice, as the Clardy and Baskes cases demonstrate.
It is now the law in the Ninth Circuit that, until a particular scheme has
been ruled invalid, the promotion of or participation in that scheme is not
criminal. This new interpretation of the criminal tax law may sound the
death knell to one phase of the government's tax compliance program. At
least in the Ninth Circuit, the government's prosecution of tax advisers
and tax evaders will be limited to those participating in schemes previously ruled upon. As a matter of law, no other prosecutions can even
reach the jury to determine intent.
Other means, however, are available to the government to continue its
campaign against abusive tax schemes. The fraud statute under which
Dahlstrom was convicted has withstood challenges for over sixty
years, 10 4 and the government should continue to prosecute when sufficient notice has been given. In addition, the Service has an arsenal of civil
102. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 339-40 (2d Cir. 1977).
103. Not only would present perpetrators promote their programs with impunity, but present
law-abiding citizens would become further dissatisfied with the tax system, and the illegal tax protest
movement would continue to grow. For recent discussions on the tax protest movement, see Henry,
Noncompliance with U.S. Tax Law-Evidence on Size, Growth, and Composition. 37 THE TAX LAWYER 1 (1983); Comment, The Tax Protest Cases: A Policy Approach to Individual Constitutional
Rights, 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 351 (1983).
104. United States v. Damon, 676 F.2d 1060, 1062-63 (5th Cir. 1982) (court specifically rejected defendant's contention that the statute is vague and overbroad); Kaplan v. United States, 241
F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir.) (court rejected the defendant's claim that the statute is unconstitutional),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 941 (1957); United States v. Borgis, 182 F.2d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 1950) (the
statute is framed to make liable those individuals who help others evade their tax liability); United
States v. Kelley, 105 F.2d 912, 917 (2d Cir. 1939) (the plain purpose of the statute was to reach the
advisers of those taxpayers who prepared their own returns).
The use of § 7206(2) to single out attorneys, certified public accountants, and enrolled agents for
prosecution was held constitutional in United States v. Sullivan, 369 F. Supp. 568 (D.C. Mont.
1974), mem., (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 1974).
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penalties that has been greatly strengthened since 1982.105 These penalties should reduce the willingness of taxpayers to follow the more devious
and questionable programs. Tax counselors, too, should be reluctant to
advise such programs due to recently increased liability. 106 These sanctions are civil, rather than criminal; therefore, the required level of proof
is less stringent. 107 In addition, the civil sanctions do not require the willfulness that the criminal statute does.
The government prosecuted Dahlstrom and his co-defendants for conspiracy as well as tax fraud; when the fraud charge failed, the conspiracy
conviction likewise could not stand. An alternative approach for the government to take when prosecuting similar activities would be to charge
the promoters with other crimes,10 8 such as mail fraud, 0 9 misrepresentation,'' 0 or aiding and abetting the willful concealment of a material
6
105. I.R.C. §§ 653(a), 6653(b) (1982) (penalties for civil negligence and fraud were increased
by 50% of the interest payable): id. § 6651 (introduced a penalty tax of 10% of any substantial
underpayment of tax); id. § 6702 (introduced a $500 civil penalty on any individual who files a
frivolous document (tax protest return)): id. § 6652 (changed the computation of interest to daily
compounding).
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-369 (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.), added § 6621(d) to increase the interest assessable on tax underpayments attributable to taxmotivated transactions. Effective as of the date of enactment of the bill. July 18. 1984. the interest
will compound at 120% of the standard interest rate provided in § 6621.
106. Stricter sanctions against advisers include penalties specifically aimed at tax shelter promoters. I.R.C. § 6700 (1982) (any promoter or tax adviser who knows or has reason to know that a tax
return is false or fraudulent as to any material matter, shall be penalized the largerof $1000 or 10% of
the gross income derived from such activity); id. § 6701 (new aiding and abetting penalties of S1000
per return available for use against anyone directly involved in the presentation or preparation of any
false or fraudulent document): id. § 7408 (a promoter of abusive tax shelters can now be enjoined
from further participation in activities subject to penalty under § 6700).
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369 (codifed in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.). increased the promoter penalty under § 6700 to the greater of $1000 or 20% of the gross
income derived from the activity, effective July 18. 1984. It also extended injunction authority to
cover persons engaging in conduct subject to § 6701.
The Service in 1983 issued a Revenue Procedure in which they outlined a program to identify and
investigate abusive tax shelter promotions and apply §§ 6700 and 7408 even before any tax returns
are filed. Rev. Proc. 83-78, 1983-2 C.B. 595.
107. I.R.C. § 6703 (1982) provides that. in any proceeding to determine whether any person is
liable for the penalties of § 6700 or § 6701, the burden of proof shall be on the government, but the
proof need not be beyond a reasonable doubt.
108. The Supreme Court ruled in 1926 that the specific provisions of the Internal Revenue laws
did not preclude application of the general criminal code to tax-related offenses. United States v.
Noveck, 273 U.S. 202, 207 (1927). The Court has maintained that position. Lofts and Lofts. 243
T.M., Tax Crimes: False Statements Under the United States Criminal Code (Part 1) A- 16 (1970).
109. The mail fraud statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). has not presented the obstacles that the
Dahlstrom court found presented by the tax fraud statute. The mail fraud statute is frequently combined with other fraud statutes to increase the penalties. The flexibility and broad reach of the mail
fraud statute facilitate its use by the Service.
110. Section 10(b) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291. 48 Stat. 881.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jjb as amended. The crime of misrepresentation can only be charged against the
seller of a security. In Dahlstrom only advice was sold. not securities. Many abusive tax shelters do
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fact. " IAlternatively, promoters of abusive shelters may be subject to attack on a different front-they may be sued by their own clients for misrepresentation' 12 or malpractice. "13
By granting broader constitutional protection to creative promoters, the
Dahlstrom decision may seriously hamper the government's recently
strengthened compliance enforcement program. The solution to the problem created by this decision does not, however, lie in a change in the
criminal tax statutes. Other circuits may still follow the lead of Clardy,
Baskes, and Ingredient and find the requisite intent even without a prior
ruling on the specific scheme. Even the Ninth Circuit may be able to distinguish the result of Dahlstrom and follow Clardy when a similar prior
civil case can be found. Although Dahlstrom may have curtailed the government's ability to apply its full arsenal of power in the abusive shelter
area, many avenues of attack are still available.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit, in Dahlstrom, has provided constitutional protection for creative tax shelter promoters, through an unwarranted extension
of the fifth amendment right of fair-notice. The Dahlstrom court relied on
involve the sale of a security, however, and this statute may be invoked if there are any untrue statements of, or omissions of, material facts. The rule allows wide latitude for prosecution for the use of
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) provides that an aider or abettor of crimes against the United States is
punishable as a principal. Id. § 1001 provides that anyone who knowingly and willfully falsifies,
conceals, or covers up a material fact, or makes a document containing any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement shall be subject to a $10,000 fine or imprisoned for up to five years. The statute does
not require that the government rely on the false statement or misleading document, nor that the
government suffer any financial loss. The concealment statute, with its less stringent intent requirement, is readily applicable to a Dahlstrom situation. The Ninth Circuit previously sustained a conviction for making false statements to an Internal Revenue agent, holding sufficient a jury instruction
that bad faith and evil motive are not required, and holding that the specific intent to defraud is not
required. United States v. Neely, 300 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962). The
court specifically differentiated "willful" in the criminal concealment statute from "willful" as used
in the Internal Revenue Code, stating that "willful" in the first instance required only that the act be
done deliberately and with knowledge. Lofts and Lofts, supranote 108, A-3, A-4.
112. Action is allowed for negligent misrepresentation; no intent to deceive is required. W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supranote 94, § 107 at 705-06. Even if made with a belief in the validity of
the program, a promotion may be negligent if sufficient care is not taken to ascertain the facts, or if
there is an absence of the skill or competence required by a specific business or profession. Id. at 745.
113. Closely related to misrepresentation, and also grounded on negligence, would be a suit for
malpractice, involving violation of a duty by the promoter toward the clent, loss to the client, and a
causal connection between the violation and the harm. This remedy is clearly available against a
licensed accountant, attorney or securities dealer; it is not so clearly available against one such as
Dahlstrom who is merely a self-professed tax adviser. Id. § 30, at 143. Even if Dahlstrom did not
have the knowledge of a tax expert, as he claimed he did, he may be held to that level of expertise.
Cf. Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 167, 151 N.E. 197 (1926); supranote 94.
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the established principle that a defendant cannot, as a matter of law, have
the requisite intent to evade tax when the tax effect of a transaction is
unclear. By applying that principle improperly, the court raised a question of fact-whether a particular transaction is fraudulent under existing
law-to constitutional proportions. Though the tax fraud statute will survive the decision, and though the government still has substantial civil
weaponry available for use against abusive tax programs, decisions of
this ilk are incorrect and only add to taxpayer unrest, encouraging further
aggressive maneuvering and evasion by disgruntled taxpayers.
Beryl N. Simpson

